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IN THE SUPREME COURT 





I DUDLEY M. AMOSS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HEBER BENNION, JR., VERA 
,V. BENNION, his wife, and BEN-










This is an action by a purchaser to obtain specific 
performance of an "Earnest Money Receipt and Off er 
to Purchase" relating to properties in Daggett County, 
Dtah, and Sweetwater County, '¥yarning. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon filing the complaint, plaintiff obtained a 
ltniporary restraining order and, after hearing, a pre-
1 
liminary injunction to prevent defendants from at-
tempting to retake possession of the property. The 
parties having agreed that a prompt trial was important, 
the case was set for non-jury trial on April 27, 196.5, 
but was thereafter continued to April 28 to permit a 
pretrial conference. At the pretrial conference defend-
ants demanded a jury trial which, if granted, would 
have delayed the proceedings ( R 1-266). * On the basis 
of the record before it, the court indicated it would 
entertain a motion for summary judgment, and such 
a motion was made by plaintiff orally (R 1-262). Next 
day, a written motion supported by affidavits was filed 
by plaintiff (R 2-40), and defendants submitted to the 
court an unsworn "Off er of Proof" setting out various 
contentions. 
The court granted a summary judgment that the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Off er to Purchase was 
binding upon Heber Bennion, Jr., and Vera W. Ben· 
nion, but reserved an issue as to their power to bind 
Bennion Ranching Company (R 1-73). 
Further discovery led to a motion for summary 
judgment against Bennion Ranching Company. The 
court granted the motion and entered a summary judg· 
ment (R 2-98), but retained jurisdiction to enter a 
"' Records were twice prepared for transmittal-but the 1:r~ 
records as transmitted are not necessarily related to thbe~ing 
ticular appeals. whose desi~nati?ns they carry, an~ the du~nation 
system is duplicated. In this brief, wherever possib.le,d es August 
"R-1" will be used to refer to pages of the record file t~ record 
17, 1965 (No. 10393), and "R-2" to refer t? .Pages .0 f ~eferred 
filed December 13, Hl65 (No. 10482). Depositions w1l~be as fix~d 
to by the name of the deponent and the page num er 
by the deposition reporter. 
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detailed decree setting out by legal description the prop-
erties, establishing times and terms of payment, deter-
mining damages for the defendant's failure to perform, 
and fixing costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the trial court's judg-
ments. 
PRELI~1INARY STATEMENT 
Defendants-appellants are apparently proceeding 
on the theory that by placing before this court a plethora 
of impertinent material which was not before the trial 
court; by including motions, orders, notices, certificates, 
and transcripts which had nothing to do with the motions 
for summary judgment; and by filling their brief with 
misstatements, unwarranted assumptions, and innuendo, 
they will be able to distract the court's attention from 
the issues, and lead it to conclude that in such com-
plexity there must be issues of fact. 
On the ground that it was not relevant to the sum-
' mary judgment questions, respondent previously moved 
this court for an order eliminating from the record on 
ap]Jeal those matters relating only to the preliminary 
injunction. Appellants seem to have taken denial of the 
motion as blanket permission to extract from the tran-
script of the preliminary injunction hearing favorable 
bit~ and pieces - ignoring self-contradictory statements 
3 
of appellants and the totality of a transcript that demon-
strates appellants' unjustified refusal to perform their 
solemn, carefully thought-out agreement. 
In this appeal the only pertinent documents are 
the pleadings, motions for summary judgment, answers 
to interrogatories, responses to requests for admissions, 
defendants' "offer of proof," two summary judgments, 
notices of appeal, designations of record, and certificates 
of the court, which together comprise 97 of the 190 pages 
of documents transmitted. In addition, the depositions 
are relevant, as are those portions of transcribed argu-
ments that contain concessions or admissions of counsel. 
Respondent will attempt to point out facts which 
were before the trial court and which, according to sworn 
testimony of the defendants, are not genuinely disputed. 
Of necessity, some reference will have to be made to 
the hearing on the motion for the preliminary injunc· 
tion (even though not properly part of the record) since 
appellants place their primary reliance upon it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. Respondent's Statement. 
The action in this case was initiated by verified 
I . t 
complaint filed on October 25, 1964. The comp ain 
alleged execution of a contract on August 12, 1964, 
under which the plaintiff was to purchase and the M 
fendants were to sell approximately 2,080 acres of real 




County, \Vyoming, known as the Bennion Ranches, 
together with all real and personal property, including 
range rights, water rights, mineral rights, machinery 
and equipment, but excepting a life estate in a home 
and five acres, along with certain water-use rights and 
personal property. 
The complaint contained averments of performance 
of conditions precedent, plaintiff's readiness to perform, 
delivery of possession of the property to the plaintiff, 
repudiation of the agreement by the defendants, and 
defendants' subsequent interference with plaintiff's pos-
session ( R 1-1 ) . 
The answer (R 1-6) admitted "preparation" of 
the contract but denied that it "constituted a contract"; 
denied the performance of the conditions precedent and 
denied repudiation by defendants; alleged lack of 
knowledge of the plaintiff's readiness to perform; ad-
mitted that the agreement contained a provision for 
~ttorneys' fees; and denied delivery of possession to the 
plaintiff and that the plaintiff was entitled to possession. 
As affirmative defenses the defendants set out ( 1) fail-
ure to state a claim; ( 2) failure of the plaintiff to make 
payments required by the contract; ( 3) that the agree-
ment was so indefinite and uncertain that it was not 
susceptible of specific performance; and ( 4) that the 
contract lacked mutuality. A counterclaim sought dam-
ages for tearing down a portion of an old shed and 
for inconveniences caused by bringing of the action 
and the issuance of the temporary restraining order 
(R 1-9 to 12) . 
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No issue was raised as to mistake, fraud, undue in-
fluence, overreaching, or plain blackguardism; and none 
as to the authority of Heber Bennion, Jr., and Vera 
W. Bennion to contract for Bennion Ranching Com-
pany. 
l The "authority" question appears to be an after-
thought stimulated by requests for admissions served 
upon the defendants (R 1-30 and R 1-35, Request 
No. 2} .J 
The Bennion Ranching Company admitted that 
on August 12, 1964, Heber Bennion, Jr., was president 
of Bennion Ranching Company, and that no instru-
ments of conveyance were tendered to the plaintiff on 
behalf of Bennion Ranching Company, but denied that 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was 
"genuine." 
In their responses to requests for admissions (R 
1-33 and R 1-35) the individual defendants admitted ' 
that abstracts with respect to 160 acres of the property 
had not been furnished to the plaintiff and that defend-
ants had not tendered to plaintiff requisite instruments 
of conveyance or contract, but denied that they had 
decided before October 25, 1964, that the property 
referred to in the contract would not be conveyed to 
the plaintiff. They admitted, in substance and e~ect 
(if not words) that they had repudiated any obligatwns 
under the contract of August 12, 1964, and that the 
repudiation was communicated to plaintiff on October 
25, 1964. 
6 
At the pretrial conference - immediately prior to 
the first motion for summary judgment - defendants 
admitted that the Earnest Money Agreement had been 
signed by Heber Bennion, Jr., and Vera W. Bennion 
in their individual capacities and by Heber Bennion, 
Jr., as president of Bennion Ranching Company, reserv-
ing the question of authority to bind the corporation 
(R 1-265) . It was also admitted that no deed or con-
tract of sale had been tendered to plaintiff, that abstracts 
of title had not been tendered with respect to all the 
properties. Defendants' counsel stated that no amend-
ments to the pleadings were necessary (R 1-266). The 
defendants insisted on the right to a jury trial (no jury 
having been called theretofore). In connection with the 
motion for summary judgment, defendants waived the 
ten-day period provided by Rule 56, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (R 1-266). 
At the hearing of the first motion for summary 
, judgment, defendants presented an "offer of proof" 
which did not meet the requirements of Rule 56 in that 
it did not show personal knowledge, or what witness 
might testify to which facts, and was primarily argu-
mentative (R 1-61 to 72). Some of the material in the 
offer of proof was in direct contravention of testimony 
I given by Heber Bennion in his deposition. A large 
I part of it was devoted to Bennion personal history, and 
I lo conversations and conferences which would not be 
' I admissible at a trial. 
The two motions for summary judgment were 
based upon the pleadings of the parties, interrogatories 
7 
and answers to them, requests for admissions and re-
sponses to them, affidavits, and the depositions of Heber 
Bennion, Jr., and J. Lambert Gibson. The information 
obtained from these sources is not as confused as appel-
lant would have this court believe. 
Mr. Bennion first met Dan Brown in July, 1964, 
at which time he told Mr. Brown he was interested in 
selling some of his land to plaintiff. Mr. Bennion had 
heard that Mr. Amoss had purchased the "Greathouse 
Ranch" adjoining his property, and thought Mr. Amoss 
might be interested in buying more land (Bennion 5 
and 6). Shortly thereafter he saw Mr. Brown again on 
one or two occasions, one of them being at Mr. Amoss' 
ranch. The upshot of the meetings was that Mr. Amoss 
made an offer for certain pieces of Bennion property 
(Bennion 7 and 8) . Thereafter some discussion took 
place with respect to what parcels of property might be 
sold but no agreement was reached, and it came about 
that Mr. Bennion suggested that Mr. Amoss and Mr. 
Brown "buy the entire ranch." This was after Mr. 
Brown appeared with Mr. Amoss (Bennion 18), prob· 
ably on August 11 (Bennion 19 and 20). 
Discussions took place at the Bennion home. Pres· 
ent were Mr. Amoss, Mr. Brown, Heber Bennion, Vera 
W. Bennion, and, during part of the discussion, an adult 
granddaughter, Rebecca Buchanan (Bennion 20-~1). 
The parties met on August 12, 1964, at which time 
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was 
filled out by Mr. Brown as the parties discussed terms 
8 
in the Bennion home (Bennion 23 and 24) . Mr. Bennion 
nirln't make any inquiry as to whether the $500.00 earn-
est money had been paid (Bennion 24). Mr. Bennion 
understood the ".Bennion Ranches" to mean all the 
properties the Bennions had in Daggett and Sweetwater 
Counties (Bennion 25) . Most of the property lies on 
the straight survey line, without angling, and although 
there are some odd lots, it was possible to make a fairly 
accmate determination of the amount of property with-
out a survey (Bennion 26). At the time the contract 
was sigued the parties understood that the conveyances 
would omit certain acreage from the "Keel place" (Ben-
nion 30). The contract made specific reference to the 
life estate to be reserved in five acres "but not to the 
Keel place," because the Keel place and the life estate 
were being treated differently: Mr. Amoss would not 
receive a deed for the Keel acreage, while a deed would 
! be given to the home and five acres, reserving the life 
! estate (Bennion 30) . 
At the time the agreement was signed Mr. Bennion 
understood that all livestock and equipment would be 
conveyed (Bennion 31) , except that specifically ex-
cepted. Provisions for conveyance of the range rights, 
• water rights, and mineral rights had all been discussed 
I • • 
' prior to the time the contract was entered into ( Benmon 
33). Constituting encumbrances against the properties 
were a Federal Land Bank loan of approximately 
' ~40,500, a Utah Farm Production Credit Association 
loan; and a contract with R. Schofield. The Earnest 
Jloney Receipt and Offer to Purchase (annexed to 
9 
Mr. Bennion's deposition as plaintiff's Exhibit "I'\ 
provided, beginning at line 12, that the total purchase 
price would be $197,000, payable in part by assumption 
of the "Federal Land Bank Loan, PCA Livestock Joan 
and R. Schofield Range contract." Mr. Bennion under· 
stood that if Mr. Amoss paid the Federal Land Bank 
loan it would be deducted from the price of the ranches 
(Bennion 35). At the time he executed the agreement 
Mr. Bennion read the print that was written in by 
Mr. Brown, and neither Mr. Amoss nor Mr. Brown 
did anything that would have prevented the Bennions 
from reading the contract (Bennion 35). Prior to the 
signing, a telephone call was placed at about noon to 
the Bennions' Salt Lake City attorney, J. Lambert 
Gibson, at the suggestion of ~Ir. Amoss. In that tele· 
phone conversation Mr. Amoss read to Mr. Gibson all 
of the matters that had been written into the contract 
by Mr. Brown (Bennion 37). There was some discus· 
sion with Mr. Gibson about the assumption of indebted· 
ness, but nothing was said to Mr. Gibson by Mr. Ben· 
nion about the effect the payment of these debts would 
have upon the balance of the purchase price (Bennion 
38). 
Mr. Bennion understood that the agreement was 
a "legal document," not just a memorandum of nego: 
tiations (Bennion 42). Subsequent to the execution ot 
the agreement Mr. Bennion did deliver to Mr. Amo)s 
title to two trucks (Bennion 43) , and did go over some 
d M AJUOSS to of the equipment with Mr. Brown an r. 
make an inventory. 
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After the contract was entered into there was some 
discussion about .Mr. Amoss preparing the deeds and 
instruments of conveyance (Bennion 49), but prepara-
tion of the instruments by Mr. Amoss was not taken 
into account in arriving at the purchase price of the 
property. The only reason Mr. Amoss was being per-
mitted to prepare them was that Mr. Bennion thought 
he wanted to do so (Bennion 49-50). 
The contract as written provided closing and de-
livery of possession on September l, 1964, but by that 
date a dispute had arisen. The day after the agreement 
was signed, Mr. Bennion said, he found some scratch 
paper on the table that had been left there by Mr. 
Brown, indicating that J.\!Ir. Amoss, at least, was plan-
ning to apply the payments made upon the PCA loan 
and the Schofield Contract, as well as the Federal Land 
Bank loan, to the purchase price (Bennion 53). After 
the disagreement as to interpretation of the contract 
was "discovered" by Mr. Bennion, negotiations took 
place over a period of time and ultimately an oral agree-
ment was reached whereby $17,500 was to be added 
to the purchase price and the amounts paid to Utah 
Farm Production Credit Association (approximately 
~35,000), were to be deducted from the total purchase 
price in the same manner as the amounts paid to Federal 
Land Bank of Berkeley were deducted (Bennion 63). 
Mr. Amoss prepared papers, including deeds and 
mortgages. After looking them over, Mr. Bennion re-
fHidiated the contract, even though he did not believe 
11 
that Mr. Amoss was insisting that those papers be used 
(Bennion 65-66) . Thereafter Mr. Bennion instructed 
the Utah Farm Production Credit Association not to 
accept money from Mr. Amoss in payment of the in-
debtedness there (Bennion 69). At about the time the 
oral compromise agreement was reached, possession of 
the Bennion Ranches was delivered to Mr. Amoss and 
he continued in possession of them until about October 
24, 1964, when Mr. Bennion told Mr. Brown he was 
retaking possession. This led to the present action. 
Facts dealing with the Bennions' power to bind 
Bennion Ranching Company will be dealt with in the 
argument of that point. 
2. Disagreement with Appelwnts' Statement. 
As required by the provisions of Rule 75(b) (2). 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the respondent sets 
out below the statements of fact found in appellants' 
brief with which he disagrees. 
Page 5 of appellants' brief: "Conferences were had 
between the Bennions and Mr. Amoss, accompanied by 
Mr. Brown, ostensibly as the real estate agent. It later 
developed, however, that Brown was a partner with 
Amoss in the purchase from the Bennions." The st~te· 
· h h · ess10n ment is meant to leave the court wit t e impr 
that Mr. Brown was Mr. Bennion's agent and was being 
untrue to him by working with Mr. Amoss. But Mr. 
Bennion's deposition (p. 8) makes it clear he had no 
illusions about Mr. Brown's participation: 
12 
"* * * LMr. Brown] told me that he had talked 
with Mr. Amoss about these lands and that they 
were interested, or that Mr. Amoss was inter-
ested, and he said that they had decided - when 
I say that, I assumed he and Mr. Amoss were 
working together***." (Emphasis added) 
Page 5: A statement that the Earnest Money Re-
ceipt and Offer to Purchase was prepared "to formalize 
an agreement which the Bennions expected would be 
drafted up in the form of a detailed contract." This 
would give the impression that the parties did not intend 
the writing to be a binding document. Compare Mr. 
Bennion's deposition (p. 42) : 
"Q. * * * it was not just meant to be a memo-
randum of your negotiations as far as you were 
concerned, was it? 
A. Well, I understood that it was a legal 
document." 
Page 9: "Amoss and Brown completed the Earnest 
Money Receipt and it was signed by Amoss as purchaser, 
by Brown on behalf of Phelps Realty and by the Ben-
nions as the sellers." The fact is that it was completed 
by Brown in the presence of all the others, while the 
discussions were going on. 
Page 10: A summary of the testimony of J. Lam-
bert Gibson is misleading, particularly the statement 
that Mr. Amoss agreed "in precisely the same terms in 
the Earnest Money Receipt" to pay the real estate 
t:innnission as he agreed to assume the loans made by 
13 
Federal Land Bank and Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association. The provisions relating to the assumption 
of mortgage indebtedness is set out in a different part 
of the contract and in an entirely different manner than 
that relating to the real estate commission. But all the 
mortgage indebtedness is treated the same. 
The following is found beginning at page 35 of 
Mr. Bennion's deposition: 
"Q. Did you read all the print that was 
written in by Mr. Brown? 
A. I think I read that - I tried to. 
Q. On line 17 at the time you executed this 
agreement did you call to Mr. Brown's or Mr. 
Amoss' attention that the Federal Land Bank 
Loan and the PCA livestock loan should be 
treated differently? 
A. No, I didn't call it to their attention. * * * 
Q. * * * At the time you signed it you did 
read it, did you not? 
A. I say, I tried to read it. We had discussed 
this and I tried to read all that was said there. I 
mean, not the small print, but I did read where 
it said 'assumed,' they would assume this. 
Q. Now, neither Mr. Amoss or Mr. Brown 
did anything at that time that would h~ve pr~; 
vented you from reading the contract, did the)· 
A. Oh, no. 
Q. As a matter of fact, prior to the time Yt 
signed it, a telephone call was placed to ~ 1· 





Q. And Mr. Lambert Gibson was your at-
torney? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Amoss suggested you call him, didn't 
he? 
A. Yes; I suggested - we call Lambert, 
Lambert Gibson, and Mr. Amoss read part of 
this contract to him. 
Q. Yes, as a matter of fact he read all of the 
matter that was written in by Mr. Brown. 
A. I think he read that, and then I talked 
with Mr. Gibson. * * * 
Q. You didn't say this to Mr. Gibson. It 
was -
A. I said most of that to Mr. Gibson. I said 
'I have just read this,' and where it says they 
will assume - yes, I told him this. 
Q. You told him that they would assume it, 
but-
A. That where I said they would assume this 
debt to Schofield and this debt to Utah Farm 
PCA, that it meant they would pay it. 
Q. * * * But, did you say anything to Mr. 
Gibson about what effect this would have upon 
the purchase price? Now, was that discussed at 
all with Mr. Gibson? 
A. Well, I don't think it came - went that 
far, what effect it would have on the purchase 
price if they paid it. * * * " 
15 
Page 10: A statement that on the day following 
the preparation of the Earnest Money Receipt the Ben-
nions noticed a piece of paper left behind by Mr. Amoss 
or Mr. Brown, "perhaps intentionally" - indicating 
something sinister, though it's not clear what. "Perhaps 
intentionally," comes only from counsel. There is no· 
thing in the record about it and no basis for speculation 
about a plot. Such a slip of paper, if anything, tends to 
establish that the parties were throughout talking about 
the payments and credits in the same way that they 
ultimately appeared in the Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase. It may be significant that Mr. Ben· 
nion didn't save the slip of paper (Bennion 54). 
Page 13: A statement that Mr. Amoss "again told 
Bennion and Gibson that he understood there would 
be no deduction except as to payments under the Fed· 
eral Land Bank mortgage," is not even supported by 
the record cited by the appellants, and that transcript 
was not before the court in the first place. In his testi· 
mony at the preliminary injunction hearing, Mr. Gibson 
said he couldn't remember and wouldn't say that Mr. 
Amoss said that the $35,000 wasn't deductible but that 
he came away from the meeting with a particular "im· 
pression." The statement that during the period up to 
October 10, 1964, in repeated other contacts with Brown 
and Amoss, Bennion was given to believe that there wai 
no further problem in this regard is not supported by 
the record. No citation is furnished. There is no support 
for the statement that lVIr. Amoss "apparently felt he 
16 
1 
could force Bennion to abandon his claim to full pay-
ment." 
Page 14: A statement that Amoss "claimed a right 
to $2,100 worth of stock which Bennion owned in the 
PCA" is misleading. As pointed out in the deposition 
of Mr. Bennion (p. 61), although the question to the 
right to stock was raised, J\!Ir. Amoss did not insist upon 
receiving the stock. 
Pages 14 and 15: The detail respecting the notes 
and mortgages prepared by Mr. Amoss is misleading 
in that it indicates there had been no previous discussion 
as to release provisions, and that Mr. Amoss was trying 
to impose new terms on the sellers. In his deposition 
(p. 49) Mr. Bennion indicates that he was permitting 
Ur. Amoss to prepare the documents because he thought 
l }fr. Amoss wanted to, not because it was part of the 
I contract. There was nothing to prevent either Mr. Ben-
1 
\ nion or Mr. Gibson from preparing the kinds of docu-
j ments they thought proper. In his deposition (p. 64) 
i 
j Nlr. Bennion says: 
1 
1 
"Q. I take it as of that date, October 11, you 
were willing to go through with the contract on 
that basis? 
A. Well, sure, that is correct. 
Q. And you remained willing until Mr. Gib-
son presented the contract to you you didn't like; 
is that about right? 
A. * * * I began to wonder - I didn't know 
why there was so much delay, and some of the 
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things he presented seemed so unreasonable to 
me that -
. Q. These were some of the things that were 
m the mortgage or the deed or whatever; is that 
correct? 
A. In those papers. 
Q. It was not because of any demands he 
made upon you or anything qf that kind. 
A. It was in the papers he had prepared for 
us to sign. 
Q. And Mr. Gibson explained to you, didn't 
he, that this was something that Mr. Amoss 
would like to do? Did he explain that to you? 
A. 'Vell, I supposed it was something he 
would like to do if he could, and it was something 
so unreasonable and would be so damaging to us 
that I couldn't figure out how he would ever 
propose something like that. 
Q. A a matter of fact, Mr. Amoss had dis· 
cussed with you the possibility of getting some 
land released ? 
A. No, I don't think he had. 
Q. Hadn't he talked to you about an ex· 
change of land with the Utah Fish and Game! 
A. Well, he had talked about, yes, the pos· 
sibility of him doing some exchanging, because 
I had had a possibility of exchanging, and natur· 
allv we talked about whether he would like to 
co~tinue on with that or not. 
Q. You realize that that would have required 
some releases before the time the mortgages were 
paid off? 
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A. Unless I did it before. 
Q. When :Mr. Gibson presented this con-
tract or mortgage to you, he didn't tell you that 
:Mr. Amoss was insisting on this kind of arrange-
ment, did he 1 
A. No, he didn't say he WM insisting. I didn't 
figure he was insisting." (Emphasis added) 
Page 15: Counsel's reference to "duplicitous con-
duct" is completely improper, is not supported by the 
record, and is name-calling outside the bounds of legiti-
mate advocacy. No fraud or unfair dealing has been 
pleaded or shown. At the time of the pretrial conference 
on April 27, 1965, Mr. Bennion's counsel stated that no 
amendment to the pleadings was necessary. Yet now, 
in a brief, counsel talks about duplicitous conduct, co-
ercion under threat of litigation, and a dozen other 
affirmative defenses which were never pleaded, were 
never in the case, and are not now in the case. 
There is nothing in the record from which it can 
be legitimately said that plaintiff "intended to renege 
on the agreement where it was to his advantage to do so 
and rely upon legal technicalities"; or to support the 
statement that "without legal training Bennion could 
not expect to meet him any longer on even terms." As 
pointed out above, Mr. Bennion has been represented 
by counsel for a long time, and the advice of his counsel 
was sought before the agreement was ever entered into. 
It may be assumed that if Mr. Lambert Gibson, an 
attorney of recognized talent and standing in the Bar, 
had had any questions about the meaning of the contract 
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he would have told Mr. Bennion not to sign it until 
he had a chance to examine it more carefully. 
In talking about the failure to pay the amount 
provided in the Earnest Money Agreement, appellant 
conveniently suppresses the facts that no tender of the 
Bennions' performance was ever made, and that the 
conditions of Mr. Amoss' duty to perform hadn't oc-
curred when Mr. Bennion repudiated the contract. 
There has never been any dispute as to what the 
"five-acre life estate'' was, the affidavit of Mr. Amoss 
establishes that the five-acre life estate was pointed out 
on the ground, and Mr. Bennion has never contended 
otherwise. Mr. Bennion is in no position to take advan· 
tage of the fact that no inventory was ever prepared, 
since this was an obligation upon him. The contract is 
clear that all of the personal property described in the 
contract is to be conveyed. The statements that the 
balance to be paid was omitted, "perhaps intentionally" 
by Amoss and Brown is not supported by the evidence. 
Of course, the balance could not be inserted into the 
contract inasmuch as it was not known. The balance to 
be paid would depend upon the amounts it was required 
to be paid upon the Schofield Contract, the PCA loan 
and the Federal Land Bank loan. The treatment in 
the brief of the provisions for assuming the debts, and 
for assumption of the real estate commission, is mislead· 
ing. The two provisions are entirely separate parts of 





THE "EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
AND OFFER TO PURCHASE" WAS DEFI-
NITE AND CERTAIN IN ALL MATERIAL 
RESPECTS AND SPECIFICALLY EN-
FORCEABLE. 
After invoking inapplicable legal principles to cre-
ate an impression that they were victimized, appellants 
concede that an "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase" may constitute a contract, Bunnell v. Bills, 
13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962), but argue that 
such agreements are enforceable only when the proper-
ties are of little value or complexity. We are unable 
to find any such distinctions being made by this court, 
and in the Bunnell case the value of the property was 
approximately the same as in the present case. 
Appellants contend that the earnest money receipt 
, leaves many important matters undecided, and specify 
a great number of matters which might have been in-
cluded but were not. Conceding the desirability of many 
such provisions, such a specimen-type contract is not 
required in order to be binding. If it were, the standard 
1 earnest money receipt and offer to purchase could sel-
dom be a contract, since it contains only the essential 
provisions. While definitiveness in contracts for the 
purchase of real property is desirable, it is not necessary. 
This is set forth in a California case, King v. Stanley, 
197 P.2d 321 (Cal., 1948), wherein it was stated: 
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"Equity does not require that all the terms 
and conditions of the proposed agreement be set 
forth in the contract. The usual and reasonable 
conditions of such contracts are, in the contem-
plation of the parties, a part of their agreement. 
In the absence of express conditions, custom 
determines incidental matters relating to the 
opening of an escrow, furnishing deeds, title in-
surance policies, prorating of taxes, and the like. 
(Citing cases.) The material factors to be ascer· 
tained from the written contract are the seller, 
the buyer, the price to be paid, the time and 
manner of payment, and the property to be 
transferred, describing it so it may be identified." 
In the Stanley case the seller, who later refused to 
go through with the transaction, also made the conten· 
tion that the writings (consisting of letters between 
1
1 
the parties) were merely part of the preliminary nego· 
tiations. In rejecting that contention the court stated: 
I "There was no determinable intent to reduce these informal writings to a formal written con· 
tract. The existence of such intent would not 
necessarily prevent a binding obligation fro.m 
arising, notwithstanding the contemplated ~:1t· 
ten or formal contract was never executed ( c1tmg 
cases), unless it also appeared that the parties 
agreed or intended not to be bound until a formal 
written contract was executed. 
* * * The mere state of mind of the parties 
is not the object of inquiry. The terms of th~ 
contract are determinable by an external, not b; 
an internal standard - of by what ha~ b~en 








In support of their position that the contract is 
too uncertain to entitle respondent to specific perform-
ance, appellants cite Bruggeman v. Sokol, 265 P.2d 
575 (Cal., 1954) and Hubbel v. Ward, 246 P.2d 468 
(\Vash., 1952), both of which are clearly distinguish-
able. In the Bruggeman case, the contract consisted 
of scrow instructions amended at last five different 
times. Each amendment affected the purchase price 
or the amount of property involved without clearly in-
dicating how the original consideration was affected. 
This resulted not so much in leaving some essential 
term undecided, but leaving in complete confusion the 
amount to be paid, and the time, place and conditions 
of payment. Moreover, the consummation of the trans-
action was specifically made contingent upon FHA 
and VA approval for construction loans, which were 
never obtained. The court recognized that not all cus-
tomary or usual provisions are required to be included 
in a real estate purchase contract to make it specifically 
enforceable, but only the material provisions, set forth 
in the Stanley case, which the court specifically cited 
and approved. 
In their treatment of Hubbel v. Ward, appellants 
leave the impression that the court denied specific per-
formance. In fact, the court ordered specific perform-
ance of the contract on condition that plaintiff pay to the 
seller the balance of the purchase price within thirty 
days from the date of judgment. In that case, the 
earnest money receipt specifically provided that so much 
Would be paid down and the parties would "sign a con-
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tract for the balance" payable at $200.00 or more per 
month. The court said this constituted an agreement 
to enter into a future contract, which would contain 
new and additional terms. The court apparently felt 
that since the parties had specifically agreed to enter 
into a subsequent contract setting forth provisions to 
govern while the purchase price was being paid, all 
material provisions were not present. It did, however, 
regard all other material items as present and stated: 
"Respondents were given an option to pay the 
balance of the consideration in cash at any time. 
By agreeing to accept payment of the purchase 
price of $29,000, in either manner, appellant 
entered into a contract of sale which, in its op· 
tional aspect, is susceptible of specific perform· 
ance." 
In any event, this court in past cases has not gone 
as far as the Washington Court in requiring specifica· 
tion of so many optional provisions. For example, 
see Fisher v. Bailey, 14 Utah 2d 424, 385 P.2d 985, 
particularly the concurring opinion of Justice Crockett, 
wherein it is stated: 
"[IJn a contract of this character where some· 
thing is to be done in connection with planned 
future activities, as was the convefan~e of ~hede 
lots, and specification of a definite tune is om1~te.' 
the law will imply that it is to be done. with:; 
some such reasonable time as must sen~1blX 
supposed was contemplated by the parties. 
"fi fornJ" In that case, this court ordered spec1 c per 
ance of a contract to sell real property even though no 
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time for the purchase thereof was specified and many 
1 
other matters were left open. 
I 
I 
Appellant also cite the case of Reich v. Christo-
pulos, 123 Utah 137, 256 P.2d 238 (1953), and what 
they say about the case is wrong. They point out that 
the court stated that the earnest money receipt was only 
preliminary and looked forward to a uniform real estate 
contract, and then state that the court held that: 
"The purchaser was, therefore, free to back 
out of the agreement to sell until the uniform 
real estate contract had been entered into." (Ap-
pellants' brief, p. 27.) 
This is not at all what the court said. In that case 
the real estate agent was given a check by the pros-
pective purchaser and was to hold it for a few days. 
The real estate agent did not pass this latter infor-
mation on to the sellers and the court stated: 
"Hill's own conduct in accepting the check 
with the promise to hold it and his failure to dis-
close this fact to the Reich es made it possible for 
Christopulos to back out of the deal and stop 
payment on the check." (Emphasis added) 
i 
I Rather than supporting appellants' position, the hold-
! ing makes it clear that had the down payment not been 
i given conditionally, the purchaser would have been 
j bound. 
\ Appellants treat the present case as though the 
1 manner of payment of the balance due was not spelled 
out, while as a matter of fact, the earnest money receipt 
25 
specifically states that the balance will be paid in fif. 
teen equal annual payments. The balance itself was 
not indicated because the exact amount of the encum-
brances being assumed by respondent was not known. 
However, that is a matter readily capable of determi-
nation, which in turn leaves the amount of the annual 
payments equally capable of determination. In the 
cases cited by appellants on this point, such was not 
the case. In Benson v. H. N. Ranch, Inc., 320 P.2d 
440 (Wyo., 1958}, for example, the agreement pro· 
vided that "balance payable by future agreement on 
or before January 1, 1954." The court held that this 
was susceptible to the two different meanings held by 
the parties ; one, that the balance would be paid before 
January 1, 1954; two, that the future agreement would 
be reached on or before January 1, 1954. Certainly 
such ambiguity is not present in this case. 
The language of the agreement in Roberts v. Adams, 
330 P.2d 900 (Cal. D.C., 1958} that the balance was 
"payable as mutually agreeable by both parties" is 
not apposite here where nothing was left open to mutual 
agreement in connection with the payments to be made. 
Appellants next argue that the earnest mo~ey 
receipt is fatally deficient because it makes no mentwn 
of the Keel property. Mr. Bennion, himself, answered 
this argument in his deposition when he stated (Ben· 
nion 29) : "We were just to hold it out, and that wasn't 
to enter into the contract at all." Then of course,. 
respondent had never disputed the fact that acreage 
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from the Keel property was not to have been included 
in the purchase. 
In one of their frequent attempts to make respond-
ent out a scoundrel, appellants make a most surprising 
1 statement. They state that when respondent said he 
would stand on his contract, he was using "a time worn 
phrase used by those who attempt to hide behind legal 
technicalities." (Appellant's Brief, p. 32). Respondent 
does not believe that this court, or any other, considers 
1 a contract to be a legal technicality. 
Next, appellants list a number of matters which 
they claim were left open and should have been included 
in the contract. l\'Iany of the items mentioned are not 
often included in the most formal contracts. If failure 
to include them prevents specific performance, few 
contracts could ever be specifically enforceable. Re-
spondents ask, for example, whether the life estate (on 
the five acres) was for the life of Mr. and Mrs. Bennion 
or the corporation; on what day of the year each pay-
ment falls due (when they admit that first payment 
is due one year from date of closing and the balance 
is to be paid in equal yearly installments) ; when, where 
and to whom interest is to be paid; where the closing 
is to take place; and whether the buyer may assign his 
interest. As pointed out in the cases previously cited, 
such details are not essential to the validity of an in-
strument. Reasonable assumptions regarding them can 
readily be made or they are controlled by legal pre-
sumptions and custom. In this connection, see Section 
27 
32, Restatement of Contracts. An examination of the 
illustrations will indicate that an omission of a number 
of minor matters will not prevent formation of a valid 
contract. 
A contention that an earnest money receipt was 
too indefinite for specific performance was made in 
Neilsen v. Rucker) 8 Utah 2d 302, 333 P.2d 1067 
( 1959), and rejected by this court. In that case it was 
argued that the description in the contract, "the dairy 
farm owned by Glen Neilsen and wife," did not suffi· 
ciently identify the land to be traded. In exhibits an· 
nexed to the contract, the real estate agent had inad· 
vertently omitted one parcel of land so that the exhibit 
showed only 52 acres, whereas the trial court decreed 
that the sellers convey 110 acres. This court pointed 
out that no one at the trial claimed that the three tracts 
included all the land which constituted the dairy farm. 
The court ref erred to the listing card showing the Neil· 
sen farm to be located three miles north of Brigham 
City, and owned and occupied by Glen Neilsen. In this 
connection the court stated: 
"The evidence without dispute clearly id~nti· 
fies the land described in the decree as the N e1ls~n 
farm. It is the only dairy farm which they claim 
north of Brigham City or elsewhere." 
* * * 
"It is elementary that in equity that is certa!n 
which can be made certain. In case * * * certain 
1 · con· lands are mentioned by name mere y ma h 
tract, without giving a definite description, t e 
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* * * lands intended in the contract may always 
be shown by extrinsic, parol, or documentary 
evidence." 
Other contentions of vagueness or indefiniteness 
were similarly rejected. 
Another pertinent case is McKinley v. Legae, 24 
Cal. Rep. 454 (Cal. App. 1962). In that case the 
plaintiffs were the owners of a ranch known as the 
"Chimney Rock Ranch." The defendant was a native 
of Belgium, but an educated and experienced person. 
He visited the Chimney Rock Ranch on several occa-
sions with real estate agents, and had been shown around 
the properties. After several such trips he made an 
offer to buy the ranch, and signed an agreement entitled 
"Deposit Receipt-California Real Estate Association 
Standard Form." The next day the parties signed 
escrow instructions and a down payment was given. 
Before an inventory of personal property, as required 
1n the contract, and a legal description could be made, 
the defendant had served upon plaintiffs a notice of 
I rescission and demand for return of his down payment, 
I on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation and his inability 
I to understand English. Defendant contended that there 
\ was no valid contract of sale because the deposit receipt 
; and escrow instructions were uncertain as to the real 
' property and personal property to be conveyed. The 
court, in holding that there was a valid contract, said: 
"The basic question is whether it is sufficiently 
definite to identify the real and personal prop-
erty to be sold. The material factors to be ascer-
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tained from the contract are the seller, the buyer 
the price to be paid, the time and manner of pay~ 
ment and the property to be transferred describ-
ing it so it may be identified (citing cases). 'How-
ever, l T]he law does not favor but leans against 
the destruction of contracts because of uncer-
tainty and it will, if feasible, so construe agree-
ments as to carry into effect the reasonable inten-
tions of parties if that can be ascertained'." 
The court said it was obvious from reading the docu-
ments that it was the intention of the parties not that 
the personal property be identified or described in 
detail but that it be ascertained and determined by the 
time of sale: 
"Appellants complaint seems to be that the 
inventory was never taken, and that the testi-
mony shows that McKinley was unable at the 
trial to describe all of the personal property and 
appurtenance to be conveyed. However, a com· 
plete answer to this lies in the absence of any 
showing that the personal property could not 
have been ascertained or identified at the time 
of sale, and in the proof that a complete inven· 
tory thereof was frustrated by defendant's own 
conduct.'' 
It was further held that defendant, by repudiating 
the contract before the closing of the escrow, had re· 
leased plaintiffs of any obligation to continue to prepare 
the complete inventory, that a description is sufficient 
and fulfills the test of reasonable certainty if it furnishe~ 
the "means or key" by which the description can be 
made certain. J\ilany of the contentions made by appel· 










Appellants next say the earnest money receipt is 
unenforceable because respondent has failed to make 
any payment on the contract. 'The answer to this is two-
fold: first, appellants repudiated the agreement before 
respondent had an opportunity to make the initial 
payment; second, there was an independent considera-
tion in that respondent agreed to purchase and appel-
lants agreed to sell the properties involved. Appellants 
state that a mere recital of a receipt of consideration 
does not prevent proof that the consideration was never 
paid. This is true, but only for the purpose of showing 
that the person promised the consideration is entitled to 
receive it. This is set forth in Section 243, Restatement 
of Contracts. 'The illustration appearing in that section 
is very close : 
"2. In an integrated agreement A promises 
to sell Blackacre for $10,000 and B promises to 
pay that sum for it. It is further provided that 
the agreement shall have no effect until B pays 
$1,000. 'There is a false recital that $1,000 has 
been paid by B. A contract exists, but A's duty 
to transfer is conditional on the full payment 
by B of $10,000." 
Respondent, of course, concedes that in order to obtain 
: specific performance he will have to pay the considera-
tion provided. His duty to pay has not yet arisen 
because appellants have never offered to or been in 
a position to perform. 'They have not tendered all the 
abstracts required of them, and in fact ejected respond-
ent from the property. In this connection see Rm sell 
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v. Farrell, 181 Kan. 259, 311 P.2d 347, wherein the 
court stated: 
"As previously indicated the Farrells had not 
place~ themseh:·es in a positi.on. to perform; they 
were m possession of the bmldmg and their title 
was encumbered. Under such circumstances there 
was no obligation on the part of R,ussells to pay 
the balance ?f the purchase price on January I, 
1956, to entitle them to a decree of specific per-
forma:tice." 
Plaintiffs' claim of estoppel was raised for the first 
time in their brief. Estoppel was not pleaded by appel-
lants as an affirmative defense as required by Rule 
8 ( c) nor was it ever raised by them at any time. In 
any event, the matters claiming to constitute estoppel 
were nothing more than those that arose during an 
attempt to settle this matter. The settlement agreement 
was also repudiated by defendants, and should not be 
considered by the court. 
In appellants' next attack they claim that they 
should have the right to reform or rescind the contract 
on the grounds of mutual mistake. This again is a 
matter that was never pleaded or raised until appel· 
lants' brief was submitted to this court. Mistake must 
· I 'tv not only be pleaded, but pleaded with part1cu an . · 
Appellants never asked for reformation of the contract. 
But even more important, the facts do not show mutual 
mistake of fact. Appellants rely on the case of Sine!'. 
Harper 118 U. 415, 222 P.2d 571, to support their 
, h tl evidence position. That, however, was a case w ere le 
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indicated that both the seller and buyer were thinking 
of a larger piece of property than that contained in the 
contract of sale. The court noted that it was highly 
improbable, under the circumstances, that the seller 
could be thinking of only one tract and the purchaser 
two, when, among other things, it was pointed out to 
the seller that the reason the purchaser wanted the 
property was to square out his adjoining property. 
That is not the circumstances of the present case. If 
there was a mistake it was a unilateral mistake on the 
part of appellants which would not justify reformation 
or rescission of the contract. There is no evidence that 
appellants and respondents both had the same thing 
m mind, but that through mistake, the agreement did 
not represent the understanding. 
The other case cited by appellants, Wright v. Lowe, 
296 P.2d 34, (Cal. 1956), appears on the surface to 
oe similar to the present case, but there is one extremely 
important difference. The seller in that case had no 
Knowledge of the large street and sewer assessments 
which the purchaser agreed to assume, and the deduc-
tion of which resulted in the seller receiving nothing 
at all for her property. The evidence indicated that 
~he expected to receive some property which she was 
going to use as a down payment on a small apartment 
nouse. Had she been aware of the large deductions 
ihe would not have had this expectation. The court 
~oints out the fact that this was a controlling considera-
ahon when it stated: 
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"Mrs. Wright was mistaken in having noun-
der~tandin~ of the deduction, contemplated by 
Wright (sic) , of the amount of the assessment~ 
The mistake was mutual and related to the same 
subject matter." 
The appellants further contend that the contract should 
be construed strictly against respondent because he is 
an attorney and according to appellants prepared the 
contract. The cases cited by appellants are not pertinent 
to this transaction. The fact is that the contract was 
not one prepared by respondent or Brown and sub· 
mitted to appellants. Rather it was prepared in their 
presence as they sat around the table and discussed the 
matter. The terms were added during this procedure. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that respondent tried 
to use his legal knowledge to the detriment of appel· 
lants. In fact, he had appellants call their attorney and 
go over the earnest money receipt with him before it 
was signed. 
II 
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT \VITH RESPECT 
TO THE PURCHASE PRICE PROVISIONS 
OF THE CONTRACT. 
. . l f . nt in the N otw1thstandmg t 1e amount o time spe 
. f . . t d finiteness, appellants' br1e concernmg issues as o e . 
and despite compounded innuendo about overreachuig. 
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it is apparent from the record that the dispute which 
gave rise to repudiation of the contract by the Ben-
ions, and to the bringing of this action by Mr. Amoss, 
was over the purchase price for the properties. 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
provides for a "total purchase price of $197,000." Mr. 
Bennion claims that in addition to the $197,000, Mr. 
Amoss was to pay $35,000 to the Utah Farm Produc-
tion Credit Association and $5,100 to R. Schofield. The 
question presented by this appeal is whether a con-
tracting party simply by raising a clamor, can create 
ambiguity where none exists, and can avoid a contract's 
plain terms by lengthy histories and constant repetition 
of "I thought," "I assumed," and "I knew," when 
those thoughts and assumptions, and that knowledge, 
are in direct contravention of actions taken. 
The Earnest Money Receipt which is the subject 
of this litigation is not difficult to understand. The 
defendants promised to sell to plaintiff the Bennion 
Ranches in Daggett County, Utah, and Sweetwater 
County, Wyoming, lock, livestock, and barrell, except 
for a life estate in the home and five acres and certain 
property listed in Schedule B and a portion of the 
Keel place which was not to be considered as part of 
the Bennion ranches. In connection with this convey-
ance the sellers agreed (Earnest Money Receipt, line 
3iJ to "furnish good and marketable title * * * and to 
niake final conveyance by warranty deed." 
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Provisions relating to the purchase price and its 
method of payment begin at line 12 of the contract 
and are set out below (the hand written portions being 
underscored and the blanks being as indicated): 
"The total purchase price of ( $197,000) One Hundred 
Ninety Seven Thousand Dollars shall be payable as follows 
$500 which represents the aforedescribed deposit, receipt of 
which is hereby acknowledged by you: $____________ _ __ when 
seller approves sale; $14,500.00 Fourteen Thous Five Hund. 
on delivery of deed or final contract of sale which shall be 
on or before Sep. 1, 1964 and $ _______________________ .each year 
commencing 1-year from date of closing. Payable in ls 
equal annual payments. Buyer to assume Federal Land Bank 
Loan; PCA livestock loan; and R. Schofield range contract 
until balance of $--------- __________________ together with interest 
is paid, provided however, that buyer at his option, at any 
time, may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments 
upon the unpaid balance, subject to the limitation of any 
mortgage or contract by buyer herein assumed. Interest at 
5% per annum on the unpaid portions of the purchase price 
to be included in the prescribed payments and shall begin 
as of date of possession which shall be on or before ~ 
1, 1964. All risk of loss and destruction of property, and 
expenses of insurance shall be borne by seller until date of 
possession at which time property taxes, rent, insurance, in-
terest, and other expenses of the property shall be pro-rated 
as of date of possession. All other taxes and assessments, 
mortgages, chattel liens and other liens, encumbrances and 
charges against the property of any nature shall be paid b'. 
the seller except: -----------------------·----------------- ______ ---
The following in the excerpted portion is important: 
(I) that the "total" purchase price is to be $197,00~: 
( 2) the provision respecting assumption of debts modi 
fies the language "payable as follows"; and (3) the 
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Ja~t sentence of the quoted paragraph provides that "all 
other taxes and all assessments, mortgages, chattel 
liens, and other liens, encumbrances or charges against 
the property of any nature shall be paid by the seller 
I t " excep : ---······················ 
If the parties had intended the PCA livestock 
loan, the Federal Land Bank loan, and the R. Schofield 
range contract to be borne by the purchaser without 
, it having any effect on the purchase price, Line 24 of 
the contract would haYe been the logical place to spell 
' this out. 
Moreover, the provision with respect to assumption 
, of the PCA livestock loan and the R. Schofield range 
contract are part of the same sentence and clause as 
that in which the buyer assumes the Federal Land Bank 
Loan; yet the sellers admit that they intended that the 
amounts paid on the Federal Land Bank loans-the 
largest of the three debts-would be applied against 
the purchase price. It is difficult to see how a legitimate 
argument can be made that the Federal Land Bank 
loan, the PCA livestock loan, and the R. Schofield 
range contract can be given anything other than identi-
rnl treatment. Anyone who can read would be aware 
, that all three of these debts were being treated exactly 
! alike. The Bennions read the provision; it was read 
" 
1 
to their lawyer. 
); This court can take judicial notice that the Ben-
1 : nions' attorney, J. Lambert Gibson, has been a member 
ie . 11f the Bar for many years, and is experienced in both 
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the District and Supreme Courts. It can also take 
notice that the standard Earnest Money Receipt and 
Off er to Purchase has been used for real estate pur-
chases in Utah for many years and that attorneys 
generally are familiar with the contents and the method 
by which the obligations of the parties are spelled out. 
Could Mr. Gibson be heard to say he didn't know what 
the provision meant-or that the debts were to be 
treated differently? 
If Mr. Bennion is permitted to get away with 
his attempt to add another $40,000 to the purchase 
price in this contract, parties may as well give up the 
idea of attempting to formalize their agreements. But 
the objective theory of contracts has long been applied 
in this state, and a contract should be construed as it 
would be by a reasonable man in the position of the 
contracting parties. 
The repudiation of the contract and the claim by 
the Bennions that they were entitled to additional com· 
pensation is a blatant effort to obtain a higher pric.e 
than they had agreed to. It is not a case of an exper1· 
enced attorney dealing with an old man and an old 
lady, but of knowledgeable sellers, represented by 
counsel, agreeing to specific provisions, then deciding 
it might be possible to obtain a higher price. In fact, 
they succeeded in obtaining from plaintiff an agree· 
ment that he would, in effect, increase the purchase 
price by $17,500. Had the parties gone further ".ith 
this agreement, presumably it would have been bindmg 
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on Mr. Amoss. However, before the agreement was car-
ried out, contract obligations were again repudiated 
oy the Bennions and an attempt was made to re-take 
the properties by self-help. 
The provision with respect to the total purchase 
price of the property was complete and unambiguous. 
To permit the defendants in this case to introduce evi-
dence of surrounding circumstances, history, and nego-
tiations subsequent to the execution of the agreement 
would be to violate the parol evidence rule as applied 
oy this and other courts. 
It is submitted that the only reasonable interpre-
lation of the contract is that $197,000 was to be paid 
: for a warranty deed to all of the Bennion Ranches 
(except for the property specifically excluded) and 
that for this price the purchaser was to obtain the 
property free and clear of liens, taxes, and encum-
hances. If nothing had been said about the loans, the 
Bennions would have been required to pay them in 
order to furnish clear title. But here the buyer agreed 
to assume them as a part of the purchase price. 
The evidence given by the defendants at the hear-
ing on the preliminary injunction was not properly 
Defore the court in the motion for a summary judg-
inent; in any event, because of the parol evidence rule, 
it would not have been material on the question of 
'0nstruction of the provisions relating to the purchase 
i11ice. The affidavits of the parties, and the deposition 
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of Heber Bennion, Jr., make it clear that the plaintiff 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the 
amounts paid to remove encumbrances placed against 
the properties by the Bennions should be a pp lied on 
the purchase price of $197,000. The price was fixed 
by Heber Bennion himself, not by Mr. Amoss, and 
the sellers should be bound by the contract they 
executed. 
III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED 
THAT BENNION RANCHING COMPANY 
WAS BOUND BY THE CONTRACT. 
Bennion Ranching Company is a close family cor· 
poration owned almost entirely by Heber Bennion, 
Jr., and Vera W. Bennion, in effect, their alter ego. 
Appellants concede that Mr. and Mrs. Bennion, when 
they signed the Earnest Money Receipt, held 78% 
of the stock. Up until a year or so before the sale, Mr. 
Bennion owned 95% of the stock. Apart from a qualify-
ing one share held by J. Lambert Gibson, the remain· 
ing stock was held by the Bennions' children, having 
been given to them between 1963 and 1964 as an estate 
planning device ( 2d Bennion Dep. 34) . 
There is also little doubt that over the years, Mr. 
Bennion managed the corporation's properties a) 
though they were his own. That this is the case was 
clearly demonstrated by the fact that appellants thern· 
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;e]m never raised any defense that the corporation 
1ras not bound until after respondent had served a 
request for admissions upon them in March, 1965, as 
rart of the technical proof in this case. The defense 
1'.as not raised in connection with the motion for pre-
liminary injunction in November, 1964, nor was any 
rrhjection made to subsequent findings of fact that all 
uf the defendants had entered into the Earnest Money 
Receipt. Although all of this took place some time 
1fter l\Ir. Bennion consulted with all of the stock-
nolders of the corporation and advised them of the 
transaction, it did not occur to anyone to maintain that 
llr. Bennion was not authorized to act for the corpo-
ration until the request for admissions. It is suggested 
• !nat this was because everyone involved considered the 
wrporation and the Bennions for all practical purposes 
10 be one and the same. This was a corporation that 
nad few stockholders' meetings, and never had an 
dection of officers after the corporation was set up, 
rxcept to fill vacancies in the board of directors when 
~lie Swans withdrew from the enterprise ( 2d Bennion 
Dep. 38). It is also notable that when Mr. Bennion 
'li1cussed the Earnest Money Receipt with his attorney, 
0nd another director, Mr. J. Lambert Gibson, over the 
tlephone, no question was raised about Mr. Bennion's 
'11thority to bind the company. 
Appellants in their brief continually speak of re-
'rrrndent reneging on his agreement. Here, however, 
't have the situation of a company run by one man 
lirr proposed the agreement entered into, then when 
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he wanted to get out of it says he wasn't authorized 
and puts pressure on his stockholders and directors to 
back him up-unless the buyer agrees to pay more. 
It may be asked just who is trying to renege. 
Appellants' attempt to rely on Section 16-10-74, 
Utah Code Annotated. There are several answers to 
their contention that the statute invalidates the sale. 
As set forth in the annotation appearing in 58 A.L.R. 
2d 784, the general rule is that statutes requiring the 
consent of a percentage of the stockholders to validate 
a disposition of corporate properties are intended for 
the benefit of stockholders. The corporation itself has 
no standing to allege the invalidity of a disposition 
executed without the consent of stockholders required 
by the statute. Appellants say there is a split of author· 
ity on this question. However, an examination of the 
annotation will reveal that the great majority of the 
cases follow the general rule. In Section 1, referred 
to by appellants, cases from only three states are shown 
following the minority view. Most of those cases 
are from the State of New York and as pointed out ' 
in a subsequent section (Section 15), the more recent 
cases in New York are now in line with the weight of 
authority. 
One case cited in the annotation is Firestone Coal ' 
Co. v. Mcl(issick, 134 Pac. 147 (Colo., 1913). In that 
case the corporation had given to the plaintiff three 
Pert\' . ~ promissory notes secured by mortgages on pro · 
owned by the corporation. In an action brought to '~1 
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foreclose the mortgages, the corporation pleaded want 
of authority in the officers to execute the note and 
mortgages in question. The defense was predicated 
upon a statute which provided that the board of direc-
, tors of a mining and manufacturing corporation should 
not have the power to encumber the mines of plaintiff 
wrporation without having submitted the question to 
)tockholders at a meeting regularly called and a major-
ity of the stockholders having voted in favor of the sale 
'or mortgage. The court held that the defense interposed 
, wuld not be asserted by the corporation, but that the 
1tockholders and they alone had the right to assert the 
defense. In doing so, it quoted from the case of 
Westerlund v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 F.2d 599, 
is follows: 
"But a corporation which has executed and 
accepted the benefits of a contract within the 
scope of its powers, that is neither in itself illegal 
nor against public policy, and that is defective 
only because in its execution the corporation has 
failed to comply with some legal requirement 
enacted for the sole benefit of third persons, is 
estopped to assail it, and the beneficiaries of the 
requirement alone may avoid it. Hence the stock-
holders of this corporation, and they alone, have 
the right to avoid this lease because they alone 
had any interest in the compliance with the legal 
requirement that they should assent to its execu-
tion." 
There are several other exceptions to the general 
:iUle that officers of the corporation may not sell the 
'torporate assets without stockholder approval. Almost 
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' 
all of these exceptions are applicable to this case. One 
such exception was set forth in O'N eal, Close Corpo-
rations, Section 805, where the author says: 
"The courts have rather consistently held officers 
in a closed corporation to possess the power to 
bind the corporation under circumstances which 
would make a similar holding questionable in a 
publically held corporation * * *. In view of the 
typical patterns of operation in close corpora-
tions, holdings of this kind can usually be recon-
ciled with traditional doctrine by viewing the 
officer whose powers are in question as in fact 
a general manager of the company thus having 
a general manager's broad powers or by apply· 
ing principles of ratification or of authority or 
apparent authority by acquiescence. In any 
event, only in rare instances, have courts failed 
to hold a closed corporation bound by inter vivos 
contracts entered into by any officer of the 
corporation." 
Cases and authorities holding that a president may 
sell the entire property of a corporation, if the cor· 
poration by a course of dealing and practice has allowed 
him to assume entire control and management of its 
affairs, are J eppi v. Brockman Holding Co., 34 Ca!.2d 
11, 206 P.2d 847; Magowan v. Groneweg, 16 S.D. 29, 
91 N.W.2d 335; Horn v. Bennett, 278 N.Y.S. 172; 
In re Fensterer's Estate, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 427; Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of Corporations, §606, wherein it is stated: 
ti 'rd~ "Thus, the president and owner of a two- 11 
interest in a corporation has a right to make a 
disposition of the corporate property." 
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Jn the Groneweg case the court stated: 
"The law neither does nor requires idle acts. 
It would be an idle act to require the stockholders 
and the directors to formally meet and authorize 
themselves to sell the property, when the man-
ager had had full control of the corporation, the 
bill of sale was signed through the officers and 
directors in the presence of the third director 
and his wife, who made no objection thereto." 
Other cases hold that where the directors have 
turned over the full and absolute management of all 
;mrporate affairs to the president, and in no way inter-
iered with his acts, he is empowered to do any acts the 
jfaectors could authorize or ratify. Allen v. France 
!Packing Co., 90 A.2d 289; Ne'lvton v. Social Circle 
\
Cotton Mill Co., 162 S.E. 667; Southern Hide Co. v. 
,Best, 141 So. 449; Fletcher supra § 594. In the South-
iim Hide Company case, the president of the corpora-
.'.ion had donated certain corporate property to the 
'wife of a deceased manager. The court held that he 
!could exercise all the powers of a general manager 
inere the board of directors had left him in charge 
•
1f the company. It was argued that donating public 
iublic property was not within the power of the board 
''directors and therefore the general manager theory 
;'1 i~ not validate the transaction. The answer to the 
1JOtention was that the shareholders had acquiesced 
n what the president had done. 
! This brings up the third answer to appellants' 
rgument, as set forth in Fletcher §605: 
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"An unauthorized sale and transfer of prop- eii 
erty by the president may be ratified by the Fl 
directors if they could have made the sale, or by 
the stockholders, and ratification may be implied 
from acquiescence. And delay, negligence and 
laches will estop the corporation to have the 
unauthorized deed of its president set aside, as 
where the directors after discovery of its execu-
tion and delivery fail to take steps promptly to ne 
have the same set aside. * * * Mere silence or In 
delay in disapproving an unauthorized act of its ti( 
president in giving an option on the corporate . 
property may furnish a presumption of approval ic 
in some cases." 'ill 
In another section, Fletcher points out that the 
unauthorized acts of corporate officers may be ratified ! 
either by the directors or the stockholders and that no 1 n1 
formal document or resolution is necessary for such :n1 
ratification. Ratification may be express or implied. It ·~ 
may be deduced from a course of conduct on the part of "1 
the directors, stockholders, or other officers of the cor· 
poration. It may be implied from the conduct of the tJ 
corporation or of officers having the authority to ratify i( 
by acceptance of benefits with knowledge of the facts 
or otherwise treating or recognizing the contract or 
act as binding. Under some circumstances it may be 
implied from mere failure to repudiate or disaffirm 
the same (Fletcher §764). 
Further, it is well settled the corporation cannot 
ratify in part or repudiate in part, as the stockholders 
't 1st attempted to do in the present case, and that 1 mt 
46 
either repudiate or ratify the whole transaction. See 
Fletcher §783 wherein its is stated: 
"If any part of the contract is adopted and 
ratified, it operates as a ratification of the whole." 
In the present case it has been shown both in con-
t· 
0 
nection with appellants' offer of proof submitted at 
1r Ifie first motion for summary judgment and in deposi-
:s tions, that the stockholders of the corporation had all 
:e ii icquiesced in the action taken by Mr. and Mrs. Bennion 
'U11til they thought that the interpretation allegedly 
1ut on the contract by Mr. Bennion was not correct. 
ie 
~d ! As shown by the offer of proof, the directors rati-
10 1iled Bennions' interpretation of the contract but would 
:h :not ratify Mr. Amoss' interpretation. A prior Utah 
I 
It 'rase involving an action against a corporation for spe-
of c:ific performance of contract to sell real estate, wherein 
1r· Ifie defense was also raised that the officers who had 
he txecuted the contract had not been authorized, is Peter-
fy ;~n v. Holmgren Land & Livestock Co., 12 Utah 2d 
~ts l.!5, 363 P.2d 786. This court, in reply to that conten-





"As to the first contention that there was no 
evidence of authorization by the board of direc-
tors of the corporation for the execution of the 
contract, it must be kept in mind that one of 
the purposes for which the corporation was 
formed by the family of which it was composed, 
was the acquiring an alienation of real property 
in connection with ranching and farming." 
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There is a similar prov1s1on in the articles of in-
corporation of Bennion Ranching Company, as well 
as a provision that the corporation might sell all of 
its assets when 7 5% of the shareholders consent. The 
court went on to state in its opinion: 
"The father of the family was the president 
of the corporation. It was at his home and at his tatio 
behest that meetings of the board of the corpora· !~e i 
tion were held. * * * 
:.1ere 
11idec 
"The minutes of the meeting were not kept In t:gaii 
as professional a manner as might be expected · 
f . r~ rom a corporation whose sole stockholders were 
not members of one family and were for the most Jtne 1 





The court appeared to be describing the activities 
of Bennion Ranching Company. 
It is appellants' contention that Don Bennion, one 
of the stockholders, should have been permitted to in· 
1 
tervene in the action. Our rules relating to intervention ::udg 
provide that applications therefor must be timely. The 11nd 
motion for intervention in this case was not made until 
after the matter had been set for trial and recessed and 
then determined much of the way by summary judg· , 
ment. There was no compliance with Rule 24 ( c), which 
provides that a person desiring to intervene shall sene 
1 
a motion to intervene upon all parties affected thereby 
which shall state the grounds therefor and shall be 
accompanied by a pleading setting forth a claim or 
defense for which the intervention is sought. More· 
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,,m, Don Bennion has never appealed from the denial 
,11' his motion to intervene. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the proxility of the appellants' presen-
lation of fact and argument, it is easy to lose sight of 
!lie issues in the case and the methods by which they 
,me presented to the trial court. The action was de-
:1ided on two motions for summary judgment, the first 
l:gainst Vera W. Bennion and Heber Bennion, Jr., 
; who had admitted they executed the contract) ; and 
jtne second against Bennion Ranching Company, with 
' ji1~pect to which a question of authority had been raised 
l
l1r Heber Bennion, Jr., president of Bennion Ranch-
ng Company, who had himself signed the contract in 
I 
d1 behalf. 
, Rule 56 establishes the procedure for summary 
1 :.udgments and provides that the judgment is to be 




"The pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material facts and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a mat-
ter of law. * * * " 
Rule 56 ( e) provides that affidavits shall be made 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
'· ou]d be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirm-
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atively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein. At the first motion for summarr 
judgment there was before the trial court the followin~: i 
the pleadings, a deposition of Heber Bennion, Jr., 
answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidarits 1 
of Dudley M. Amoss and Dan Brown. In opposition 
to the motion for summary judgment the defendants · 
tendered to the court an "offer of proof," which did not ~ 
in any way comply with the requirements of Rule 
56 ( e) , or with the requirements for offers of proof. 
:ti 
The "offer of proof" which begins at R 1-61, is J 
composed of 12 pages of argument and general state· ,,J 
ment as to what the facts are. Patently, the offer does 1 
I' not show personal know ledge on the part of any par· 111 
ticular person, does not show what witnesses would !m 
testify to what facts, and is filled with conclusions, lti 
assumption, and arguments of counsel. It ought not 1 
to have been considered by the trial court in connection 
ii 
with the motion. 
Moreover, even if considered, it does not contain u1 
anything which would raise a genuine issue as to any u 
material fact. We submit that statements relating 10 ~ 
conversations and conferences, following the execution 
of the agreement, and the negotiations prior to it. arr .Jo 
not relevant in determining the purchase price of the ~I 
h . . 1 1 t t d in the ·~· property. The pure ase price is c ear y s a e . . , · 
contract and the evidence of surrounding negotiatiorn ~1 
and transactions is not admissible to create an ambi· ~ 1 
guity. 
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There might have been a factual issue about the 
1 Keel place, and which 60 acres were to have been re-
tained by the Bennions, and as to the description of the 
!1ome and five acres, in which the Bennions were reserv-
.. 1 mg a life estate. However, as the case developed, fact 
n ~sues were not raised with respect to these matters. 
t) The affidavit of Dudley M. Amoss in support of the 
it motion for summary judgment contains statements 
le 1liat the home and five acres was pointed out to Mr. 
Amoss by Mr. Bennion, and that the parties agreed 
!nat the portion of the Keel place to be retained was 
15 is set out in the judgment. The so-called offer of proof 
:e· ,foes not contain any offer even as to what property 
ies ;~as to be included in the Keel place and there is no 
11
• ltridence to rebut the affidavit of Dudley M. Amoss 
1ld I. h' :n t is respect or to show that other or different prop-
ns, ' 
;trty was intended. 
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ion Although the appellants' brief was filled with 
1latements about negotiations that occurred subsequent 
'rilhe execution of the Earnest Money Agreement, these 
am legotiations are not relevant to the interpretation or 
1ny nnstruction of the contract, since no ambiguity existed 
· to ~th respect to the purchase price. Moreover, the de-
tion 'tndants have not claimed and, so far as we can tell, 
arr ~1Jnot now claim that the Earnest Money Receipt and 
the ~ffer to Purchase was superseded by a subsequent 
the ~ntract between the parties. There was an oral agree-
ions Jent between the Bennions and Mr. Amoss that, in 
11bi· instance, the purchase price would be increased by 
'li,500; and this agreement was entered into in an 
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effort to compromise and settle a dispute that had bee11 im 
engendered by the Bennions' claim about the purchase jrn 
price. This settlement agreement, if it had been per· itri 
formed on the Bennions' part, might have bound the ith< 
plaintiff to add $17,500 to the purchase price. But !!'!€ 
I 
before documents of title were tendered by the Ben· !Rt 
nions, Mr. Bennion on or about October 24, 1964, re· 1~ 
pudiated any agreement and attempted to chase Mr. :1lic 
Amoss and his helpers off the Bennion ranches. That lrh€ 
repudiation led to the lawsuit, and it relieved the plain· l!ee 
tiff of any obligation to go through with the compromise it~€ 
and settlement agreement. dn: 
Iii 
With respect to the Bennion Ranching Company, I 
the evidence is clear that "lack of authority" was an 
afterthought of either Mr. Bennion or his counsel iu 
an effort to raise as many obstacles as possible to en· 
forcement of the contract. The depositions of Mr. 
Bennion and Mr. J. Lambert Gibson taken on May 
28, 1965, show that the corporation was a close corpo· 
ration and in substance the alter ego of Heber Beu· 
nion, Jr. It had been used by him as a device for carry-
ing out estate plans, and none of the other stockholders 
participated in the management in any degree. Although 
aware of the contract, not one of them tried to do any-
thing about it until Heber Bennion himself indicated 
he didn't want the corporation to be bound. Indeed, it 
was Heber Bennion's counsel who moved for inter· 
vention in behalf of Don Bennion (R2-177). 
. dcr The trial court properly entered summary JU I'. 
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I 
1 '.,ment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defend-
\ints as requested in the two motions. In addition the 
\!rial court added to each of the judgments a certificate 
e :
1
:hat there was no reason for delay and directed the 
\,,\erk to enter the judgment forthwith as provided in 
I 
1Rule 54 ( b) , and the judgments were final for the pur-
\roses of appeal. The fact that the court retained juris-
1,Jiction to work out the details of the decree and to fix 
I 
l:nedamages and costs, including a reasonable attorney's 
liee, did not preven this. The substance of the case had 
I 






;inal for purposes of appeal. In re Voorhees Estate, 
\11 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977. 
I 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYCE E. ROE 
RALPH L. JERMAN 
510 American Oil Building 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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